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Abstract
We empirically characterize the mechanics of trade adjustment during the Argen-
tine crisis using detailed transaction-level customs data covering the universe of import
transactions during 1996-2008. Though imports collapsed by nearly 70 percent from
2000-2002, the entry and exit of rms or products at the country level (the \extensive
margin") played a small role in this adjustment. By contrast, the within-rm churning
of inputs (the \sub-extensive margin") played a sizeable role, and we highlight signi-
cant heterogeneity in how rms adjusted their import mix. Motivated by these facts,
we build a model of trade in intermediate inputs with heterogeneous rms, xed import
costs, and roundabout production to evaluate the channels through which a collapse
in imports aects productivity. Import demand is non-homothetic and therefore the
implications for productivity depend on the details of individual rm adjustments and
cannot be summarized by the change in the aggregate import share. We simulate the
model to discuss quantitatively these mechanisms in the context of an imported input
cost shock that produces a signicant productivity decline.
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Large crises such as the Mexican crisis in 1994{1995, the East Asian crisis in 1997{1998, and
the Argentine crisis in 2001{2002 are characterized by large exchange rate depreciations and
collapses in imports. The dollar value of Argentina's imports, for instance, dropped by 69
percent between 2000 and 2002. A second feature of these episodes is the large decline in
real GDP and total factor productivity (TFP). Sandleris and Wright (2011) document an 11
percent decline in TFP of continuing manufacturing plants in Argentina between 2000 and
2002.1
In this paper we do two things. First, we empirically characterize the mechanics of trade
adjustment at the rm and product level during the Argentine crisis. Our analysis makes use
of detailed rm-level customs data covering the universe of import transactions for Argentina
during 1996{2008, a period that includes a dramatic nominal exchange rate depreciation and
trade balance reversal. Second, motivated by the empirical evidence, we develop a model of
trade in intermediate inputs with heterogeneous rms, xed import costs, and roundabout
production to evaluate the channels through which the collapse in imports aects a welfare
relevant measure of productivity in manufacturing.
The trade literature includes many empirical analyses of the impact that permanent
shocks such as trade liberalizations have on the extensive margins of adjustment|either
via changing the allocation of resources across rms (Melitz, 2003) or via changing product
varieties (Krugman, 1980). This paper empirically evaluates how important these various
forms of extensive margin adjustment are at business cycle frequencies, particularly in the
context of a large crisis.
We establish the following facts about the collapse in imports during Argentina's crisis.
First, the number of rms that exit the import market is large, but when weighted by value
these exits explain a small share of the total decline in imports. The number of importing
rms dropped from over 15,000 to less than 7,000 over the rst four quarters of the crisis and
did not return to its pre-crisis level for about ve years. However, the net contribution of rm
entry and exit explains less than 8 percentage points of the 69 percent decline in imports
1Meza and Quintin (2006) document that TFP declined by 8.6 percent in Mexico in 1994, by 15.1 percent
in Thailand, and by 7.1 percent in South Korea during the East Asian crisis.
1during the crisis. The pattern is similar for the number of imported product varieties.
The number of distinct 10-digit Harmonized Tari Schedule (HTS) product codes imported
dropped from approximately 13,000 to 10,000 over the same period and also took about ve
years to recover. Product entry and exit, though, only explains between 0 and 15 percentage
points of the decline depending on the denition used. These ndings hold when looking at
the quarterly or annual frequency, when looking at normal times as well as during the crisis
and recovery, and when separately considering each end-use category.
The reason for this result is the high degree of concentration in international trade among
a small number of key rms and sectors. The largest 5 percent of importing rms contribute
approximately 85 percent of Argentina's imports and generally do not change their import
status after the crisis.2 Similarly, the largest 5 percent of imported 6-digit HTS categories
together account for about 60 percent of imports and are rarely dropped from the set of
aggregate imports.
However, trade in most countries, including Argentina, consists primarily of intermediate
inputs. It is therefore important to examine what happens to the bundle of imports at the
rm level as opposed to the country level. Even if a particular input variety continues to be
imported into the country, it may still be the case that several rms stop importing it and
thereby experience changes in their unit costs of production.
As an illustration, Figure 1 shows sample import activity for two large Argentine in-
dustrial manufacturing companies, both among Argentina's top 50 importers: BGH S.A.
and Siderca S.A.I.C. Both companies imported heavily in key intermediate input categories
before the crisis, but stopped importing these inputs during the crisis.3 These products
disappeared from the import bundle of these two companies, but this absence would not be
observable in aggregate data because other Argentine rms continued to make purchases in
all of these categories during the same period. Further, while these two companies stopped
2As discussed below, we can rule out the possibility that the largest importers are simply huge distributors
or import/export brokers.
3BGH imported industrial cooling fans and anti-vibration materials, largely from Motorola, during most
quarters in 2000 and 2001. With the onset of the crisis and after the exchange rate shock, imports of those
goods dropped to zero for six quarters, only to return in late 2003. Siderca, after importing more than
$2 million of tools for steel-cutting lathes in 2001 and spending more than $200,000 on imported tools for
aluminum smelting and mixing, exited those import markets completely in 2002 and early 2003. By late
2003, they returned to importing in those sectors and by 2004 spent almost $9 million on those imported
goods.
2importing these particular inputs, neither company would appear in aggregate extensive
margin calculations because they continued importing at least some other product during
the crisis. More generally we document that many imported products which are dropped
by a clear majority of importers are not considered to be dropped varieties at the aggregate
level because a minority of rms continue to import them. A product only contributes to
the extensive margin at the country level if all importers of that variety happen to decide to
stop importing it, something unlikely to happen for goods with large import volumes.
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Figure 1: Sample Quarterly Product Imports for Two Large Argentine Firms
This observation leads to our second empirical nding: Within-rm changes in the mix of
imported varieties and supplier countries, regardless of whether other importers drop those
same varieties, play a signicant role in trade adjustment. This within-rm extensive margin,
or \sub-extensive" margin, explains up to 45 percent of the 69 percent decline in imports
between 2000 and 2002.
Third, we nd that the way importers adjust their imports varies with the size of the
rm. The extensive margin, when a rm exits trade entirely, is the most prevalent margin of
external adjustment for the smallest rms. Among continuing importers, the sub-extensive
margin becomes less important as the size of the importer grows. The largest rms adjust
primarily by reducing|but not dropping|their imports of particular products, which we
call the sub-intensive margin. As a result, the largest pre-crisis importers exhibited smaller
percentage declines in their import volumes.
3Fourth, we estimate the impact of sub-extensive margin adjustment on unit costs under
the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. If inputs
are imperfect substitutes, a drop in the number of imported varieties used will raise rms'
unit costs of production. In the absence of rm-level data, one would conclude that the
impact on the unit cost of an import bundle arising from dropped varieties is close to zero.
Our rm-level data, by contrast, imply that this unit cost increased by up to 13 percentage
points for a typical importer due to the sub-extensive margin.
Motivated by these empirical facts, we build a simple partial equilibrium model of a
monopolistically competitive industry (manufacturing) that imports intermediate inputs.
The rms in the industry dier in terms of their technology, pay xed costs for importing
input varieties, and use each other's output as inputs giving rise to roundabout production.
The intermediate input aggregator in the production function displays a \love of variety"
feature with inputs being imperfectly substitutable as in Ethier (1982). We introduce an
imported input cost shock and study the implications for a welfare relevant measure of
productivity.
We start by using the model to clarify why imperfect competition implies that, in contrast
to ndings in the previous literature, terms of trade shocks have a rst-order eect on
productivity. We follow Basu and Fernald (2002) and calculate productivity as the Solow
residual with value added factor share weights that need not sum to one, the standard welfare
relevant measure. We assume imperfect competition in the product market, which implies
that the marginal rate of transformation of factors in the production function exceeds their
marginal rate of substitution in the utility function. As a result, shocks that reduce the
scale of a rm's production have a rst order eect on productivity even when technology is
unchanged, an insight that goes back to Hall (1988, 1990).
An imported input cost shock increases the unit cost of production because domestic
and imported inputs are imperfectly substitutable. Roundabout production amplies the
shock because the increase in one rm's costs results in higher output prices which imply
higher input prices for other rms. These cost increases can reduce the relative demand
for output of sectors that rely on imported inputs (manufacturing) relative to those that
do not (like services) generating a decline in the scale of production of manufacturing and
4therefore productivity. The presence of intermediate inputs can render large the impact on
productivity, even when markups are small but non-zero.
Next, we use the theory to focus on three repercussions for productivity of our empirical
ndings on the sub-extensive margin. First, in the presence of xed costs, rms adjust input
use both along the intensive and sub-extensive margins by dropping imported varieties. The
elasticity of imports to the shock is therefore bigger. Moreover, the change in imported
input varieties generates an increase in unit costs above and beyond that implied by the
shock, along the lines of Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009). These two forces work in the
direction of generating a greater decline in productivity. On the other hand, there is also
a force pushing productivity in the opposite direction, as less labor is used to pay for xed
costs. Second, we show that the model with sub-extensive margin generates non-homothetic
import demand, with larger rms importing a larger set of varieties. This implies the impact
on aggregate productivity will depend on the details of the individual rms' responses to the
shock and cannot be summarized by the change in the aggregate import share. Dierences in
sub-extensive margin adjustment imply dierences in the change in rms' unit costs, leading
to changes in rms' market shares. The change in aggregate import share does not equal
the import-weighted sum of changes in rm-level import shares. Third, our theory claries
how the sub-extensive margin implies mismeasurement of productivity. Standard national
accounting practices, including those used in Argentina, use \matched-model" price indices
that ignore changes in varieties. If production is CES, this practice would underestimate
the increase in input prices, thereby increasing imputed real intermediate input use and
decreasing measured productivity. This mismeasurement is only economically meaningful
when taking into account the sub-exensive margin.
We then calibrate the input cost shock to match our empirical ndings for Argentina and
simulate the model to evaluate quantitatively the combined impact of these channels relative
to standard models that exclude sub-extensive margin adjustment. The eects of the shock
are sizable with productivity declining by over 5 percentage points. In the absense of rm-
level data, one might ignore heterogeneity in trade responses across rms and conclude that
dropped input varieties were not an important part of adjustment. We therefore compare our
benchmark simulation to a calibration of our model without xed costs, as one might choose
5if guided only by aggregate data. We show that the model with active sub-extensive margin
adjustment exhibits a productivity decline nearly 30 percent larger, or 1.2 percentage point
more, than that in the equivalent specication without a sub-extensive margin and exposed
to the same shock. If we additionally take into account the mismeasurement implied by
dropped varieties, the sub-extensive margin generates a measured productivity decline more
than 50 percent larger than the equivalent model without a sub-extensive margin. We also
consider simulations without roundabout production and nd the productivity decline is
about one half the size of the benchmark case.
There clearly were many other negative shocks that impacted productivity during the
Argentine crisis. The time-series pattern for TFP, imported input use, and sub-extensive
margin adjustments, however, do oer corroboration that the mechanisms highlighted in
our paper may well have been salient for TFP in Argentina over this period. The share
of input spending on imports and the importance of the within-rm dropping of import
varieties moved together with TFP both in the period of economic decline and recovery.
We focus on Argentina due to the availability of long-dated and detailed transaction-level
data surrounding an acute sudden stop and exchange rate shock. Our analysis, however, has
broader relevance and can help answer the question of how trade adjusts and the impact
this adjustment has on the macroeconomy during business cycles and crisis episodes.
Related Literature
This paper relates to many literatures. First, it relates to the literature that empirically
characterizes the margins of trade adjustment and is consistent with the ndings of Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2009) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) who use U.S.
data to document that the rm and aggregate product extensive margins are small while
the sub-extensive margin is large.4 Distinct from their analysis we focus on a dramatically
larger trade adjustment episode using the Argentine experience and specically evaluate the
implications of these ndings for productivity.
Second, it is related to the literature that evaluates the impact of imported interme-
diate inputs on productivity. See, for instance, Amiti and Konings (2007) and Goldberg,
4Also see di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) who argue that this nding can imply the welfare impact of
high entry costs on production is small.
6Khandelwal, Pauvcnik, and Topalova (2009) for the impact of liberalization and increased
trade in Indonesia and India, respectively. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) use Hungarian
rm-level data to document gains from improved access to imports when these imports are
imperfectly substitutable for domestic inputs at the rm level. Their measure of productiv-
ity gains is the decline in rms' unit costs (marginal costs) of production arising through
the sub-extensive margin. We evaluate the impact on a welfare relevant measure of produc-
tivity that diers from changes in unit cost, and we study the implications for aggregate
productivity of the various margins of trade adjustment.5
Third, our work relates to research linking terms of trade shocks to productivity and
welfare. Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) argue that, under perfect competition, terms of trade
movements have no rst-order eects on productivity. This is not the case in our environment
since rms are price setters who charge markups. As is well known from Hall (1990) and Basu
and Fernald (2002), in the presence of markups, variations in the use of primary factors and
in the intensity of use of intermediate inputs will have a rst order impact on productivity.6
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) point out that in a broad class of models,
all that is needed to evaluate trade-induced changes in welfare is the observed change in
aggregate trade shares and an appropriate elasticity. The specics of rm-level adjustment
do not matter. On the contrary, in our setting the full distribution of import shares are
needed to evaluate aggregate eects on welfare and productivity. There are economically
meaningful dierences between an environment with and without xed costs even when they
both generate the same change in aggregate import shares.
Lastly, our work is related to Sandleris and Wright (2011) and Neumeyer and Sandleris
5Broda, Greeneld, and Weinstein (2006) also evaluate the gains in unit costs in many countries brought
about by increased input varieties at the sector level from 1994{2003. Feenstra, Mandel, Reinsdorf, and
Slaughter (2009) consider the possibility that unmeasured gains in the terms of trade around 1995 contributed
to the measured productivity acceleration in the United States. Among other channels, they highlight the
failure of conventional price indices to account for the increase in varieties of traded information technology
products. Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) note, also in the context of the Argentine crisis, that
changes in price indices may be biased downward during large devaluations because households substitute
toward lower-quality goods. Burstein and Cravino (2010) evaluate how trade liberalizations lead to increases
in real GDP if price indices partially capture reductions in taris.
6Ghironi and Melitz (2005) highlight the impact of rm entry and exit decisions on business cycle mo-
ments. Mendoza and Yue (2009) explore quantitatively the impact of imperfect substitutability between
domestic and imported intermediate inputs coupled with a worsening of the terms of trade on the ampli-
cation of nancial shocks.
7(2010), which explore the impact of misallocation on TFP during the Argentine crisis and
nd that it plays an important role. We view our explanation for the productivity decline
as complementary to the one proposed in these other papers.
2 Data
After eight years of growth averaging just under 6 percent per year, Argentina entered a
recession in 1999, with GDP, consumption, and investment all declining in real terms. The
recession worsened sharply in 2001:Q4, with real GDP ending 2002:Q1 more than 16 percent
below its level a year earlier. A large banking and currency crisis ensued and the Argentine
peso rapidly depreciated by nearly 200 percent relative to the U.S. dollar. Argentina's
dollar-denominated import price index was relatively stable, implying an upward spike in
peso-denominated import prices that resulted in a 69 percent drop in dollar imports from
2000 to 2002.7
We now describe the data we use on rms and trade transactions during the Argentine
crisis. We bring together three datasets, starting with two datasets containing Argentine
customs data provided by private vendors called Datamyne and Nosis. We combine these
data with operating and nancial information on the largest Argentine rms, available from
the Capital IQ database.
2.1 Detailed Trade Data from Customs
Our data are collected from import and export shipping manifests by the customs agency
in Argentina and are publicly released. The data vary somewhat in coverage over time,
but give detailed information for each trade shipment, generally including the name of the
importer or exporter, the date of declaration, the source or destination country, the quantity,
weight, price, and value of the good, along with detailed information at levels at least
as disaggregated as the 10-digit HTS classication.8 We obtained most of our data from
7There was a secular shift in import market shares away from U.S. and toward Brazilian exporters
from 1999{2006, but the crisis of 2001{2002 itself did not have an obvious impact on the import shares of
Argentina's trading partners.
8Argentina additionally adds its own code with an 11th digit and a letter (as the 12th character, A-Z) to
the HTS classication, so these products can often be easily distinguished at a 12-digit level.
8Datamyne, a private provider of these trade statistics that receives a daily electronic feed
from the customs authorities.9 Subject to the few exceptions detailed below, we obtained
data on all trade in goods for Argentina for the 1996{2008 period. We now describe the
imports and exports data in turn.
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Figure 2: Our Dataset Compared to Other Sources
Figure 2(a) compares the total value of Argentina's imports in our dataset with the value
reported in the International Financial Statistics database provided by the International
Monetary Fund. The data line up extremely well, including at high frequency, with the
only exception being a period from mid-1997 to early 1999 when our data miss about one-
third of the imports because Argentine customs did not provide it to Datamyne. Further,
we compare reporting on these ows to their counterparts in data collected by the Foreign
Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. Figure 2(b) demonstrates that though some
discrepancies clearly exist, the basic patterns captured in the U.S. bilateral trade data are
also reected in our micro dataset.
Economy-wide, imports come from more than 100 countries, include more than 15,000
HTS codes, and often reect more than 100,000 dierent country and product code combi-
nations. The smallest importers may trade with only one partner, but some importers are
9Though Datamyne does not add or edit any information on its own, it takes signicant measures to ensure
the information is fully and accurately transmitted from the customs authority. Moreover it is among the
few such data providers that has received International Standards Organization (ISO) certication, reecting
the reliability of its quality control systems.
9supplied by over 40 dierent countries and themselves import in nearly 900 categories. Table
1 lists these and related summary statistics for imports in 2000 and 2002.
2000 2002
# of Importing Firms 25,138 13,980
# of Supplier Countries
Economy-wide 135 130
Per Firm, median 2 1
Per Firm, maximum 44 36
# of Imported HTS Codes
Economy-wide 17,333 15,831
Per Firm, median 5 4
Per Firm, maximum 899 733
# of Imported Country X HTS Combinations
Economy-wide 115,724 80,781
Per Firm, median 6 4
Per Firm, maximum 2,067 2,176
Table 1: Import Summary Statistics
The Datamyne data include the equivalent information on export transactions from 1996{
2008, though the exporter names are redacted from 2000 onward. This redaction was per-
formed by Argentina's customs authority and is not specic to the Datamyne data. To
overcome this problem, we merge the data from Datamyne with another dataset covering
the period subsequent to 2000 that we obtained from Nosis, a private vendor.10 Unfortu-
nately, the Nosis data omit rm identiers for a large share of the transactions in 2000 and
2001, so we cannot do the same analyses for exports as we do for imports.11
10Nosis combines their own market knowledge with an algorithm that compares export transactions for
the post-2000 period, when exporter names are not available, to earlier transactions that include the names
in order to generate a \probable exporter." For instance, if an export transaction in 2003 had similar port,
HTS, volume, and destination information as several of BGH's export transactions from the late 1990s,
the algorithm would likely list BGH as the exporter in 2003. The Nosis database does not contain tax
identication codes that we use as our rm identiers so we hired data analysts to use text-matching software
to link the two parts of our export data. We identify each rm by its CUIT, which is the company's tax
identication number. This is a more stable and reliable indicator of each rm than the \name" eld, which
is more prone, for example, to typographical errors.
11See Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2010) for a related analysis of Argentine exports.
102.2 Capital IQ Database
We match the rm names in our trade data with the Capital IQ database so we can learn more
about the importers themselves. Capital IQ contains operating and nancial information on
about 4,500 rms in Argentina, including public, private, domestic, and multinational rms.
Our trade data include dramatically more rms, but given the concentration of trade and
Capital IQ information among the largest rms, we are able to match rms accounting for
60{70 percent of Argentina's imports.
Table 7 (found at the end of the paper) lists Argentina's largest 50 importers for the
period 1996{2008, along with their primary industry and primary sector, as reported in the
Capital IQ database.12 Seven of the largest eight importers, themselves responsible for a
bit less than 10 percent of total imports in a typical year, are all Argentine subsidiaries
of foreign automobile manufacturers. Outside of these seven, however, many industries are
represented with no obvious concentrations or patterns. Though most of the companies are
recognizably not trading rms or distributors, we formalize this analysis using data on the
primary industry of importing rms. The monthly share of imports by rms with primary
industry data that go to rms classied as \Distributors," \Food Distributors," \Healthcare
Distributors," \Technology Distributors," or \Trading Companies and Distributors" ranges
from about 3 to 8 percent. These percentages are fairly stable throughout the dataset.
3 Empirical Findings
In this section we report our main empirical ndings. We show that the large decline in
aggregate imports during the crisis is explained primarily by declines from continuing im-
porters and has little to do with the entry and exit of rms into and out of import status.
The adjustment in trade takes place within rms at what we call the sub-intensive and
sub-extensive margins as rms both reduce the import value of each continuing variety and
reduce the number of imported varieties. Firms typically dier, however, in their decisions of
which varieties to drop, with one rm dropping a variety and another continuing to import
12We exclude Argentina's Central Bank, which is credited in the data with some import ows associated
with its extension of trade nancing. We had a research assistent ll in blank entries for companies' primary
sector and primary industry classications.
11that same item. As a result, our rm-level data reveal that the product extensive margin is
an important source for adjustment, but an analysis of aggregate data would conclude it is
insignicant.
Additionally, we show that the relative importance of the extensive, sub-extensive, and
sub-intensive margins varies with rm size, and the import volumes of larger importers
decline proportionately less than those of smaller importers. Finally, we show that if inputs
are imperfect substitutes, within-rm sub-extensive margin adjustment impacts the unit cost
of production for rms. Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution, we calculate that
the unit cost of the typical import bundle increased up to 13 percentage points more than
what one would infer based only on information contained in aggregate data. We describe
in detail the ndings below.
Finding 1: Dened as the entry and exit of rms or the entry and exit of
products at the country level, the \extensive margin" plays a small role in
understanding trade adjustment during the crisis.
Total dollar imports declined by 69 percent from 2000 to 2002. We rst evaluate what
fraction of this decline is explained by rm entry and exit into and out of import status and
similarly what fraction is explained by the entry and exit of products into the import bundle.
Figure 3 shows the number of importers and number of imported 10-digit HTS categories
for 1996{2008, excluding the period in the late 1990s when the data are incomplete. We
nd that the number of rms that imported any goods in each quarter dropped by more
than one-half and the number of imported product categories dropped by nearly one-fourth.
However, in terms of volumes these entries and exits explain a small fraction of the decline
in imports.
We can disaggregate the intensive margin from the importers' margins of entry and exit
as follows:
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where vi;t is rm i's total (fob) spending on imports, 	t is the set of all importing rms
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Figure 3: Number of Importing Firms and Products
in period t, vt =
P
i2	t vi;t are total imports in the economy, and vt = vt   vt 1. The
rst term on the right hand side of Equation (1) is the intensive margin and captures the
change in imports from continuing importers. The second term is the extensive margin and
captures the value of imports from new importers net of the volume lost from those that
stopped importing in period t.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, for denitions of t as quarters and as years, the breakdown
of aggregate movements in trade by intensive and extensive margins. Note that the sum of
these lines equals the growth rate of aggregate imports. They plot the share of overall import
growth due to each margin, not the growth of each margin, and therefore correspond to the
economic signicance of each type of adjustment. The plots demonstrate that the entry or
exit of rms or products attribute only a small share of the change in the volume of imports.
For example, the black line in Figure 4(b) dips to about -57 percent in 2002 while the red
line reaches about -4 percent. This means that while overall imports declined by nearly 61
percent in 2002 compared to 2001, the vast majority came from the intensive margin.
We can do the equivalent exercise for products, where we use the same disaggregation
(1), but redene 	t to be the set of all imported product categories in period t. Figures
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Figure 4: Various Extensive Margin Denitions by Quarterly and Annual Data
144(c) and 4(d) use the 10-digit HTS denition, and Figures 4(e) and 4(f) dene goods as the
interaction of the 10-digit HTS code and exporting country. Argentina implemented HTS
revisions in 1996/1997 (though it is unclear which month), May 2002, and May 2007. This
series of revisions potentially introduces an upward bias in our calculation of the extensive
margin's importance. We use the concordance in Pierce and Schott (2009) to attempt to
solve this problem, but can only apply this procedure for the 6-digit HTS codes. Pierce and
Schott base their concordance on U.S. data, and 6-digit is the most disaggregated level at
which the codes are internationally comparable. These adjustments make little qualitative
or quantitative dierence. As with the extensive margin of importers, the quantitative
importance of the extensive margin of imported products is small.13 (One exception is 1997,
when the changing code denitions clearly impacted the 10-digit disaggregation.)
Total % Intensive % Extensive
Firm -69% 0.89 0.11
HTS 6 -69% 1.00 0.00
HTS 10 -69% 0.92 0.08
HTS 6 X Cty -69% 0.91 0.09
HTS 10 X Cty -69% 0.79 0.21
Table 2: Intensive and Extensive Margins, 2000{2002
Table 2 summarizes these results and splits total trade adjustment for 2000-2002 into
intensive and extensive margins for varying product denitions. Total imports in 2002 were
69 percent below their already depressed levels in 2000 and these ows were generated by
about half as many importing rms. However, the last column of the top row shows that
the contribution to the 69 percent decline from the rm extensive margin was less than 11
percent, or 8 percentage points, and the last column of the second row shows that essentially
none of this adjustment came from dropped 6-digit product categories. Very little trade
adjustment at business-cycle frequencies, even in the event of a large contraction in imports,
13We have also looked at the trade patterns for 1996{2008 of a constant set of goods or importers chosen
to include all goods of rms involved in trade in a particular year. The exit of imported products is virtually
irrelevant for the long-term change in imports through the crisis | from late 1998 to early 2002 | and new
products explain at most about one-quarter of import growth from 2002 to late 2006. We have separately
generated these plots by good type and the pattern is very similar across 1-digit end-use categories.
15is explained by rm entry and exit or by product entry and exit at the aggregate level. This
nding extends the ndings in Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) and Arkolakis,
Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) to characterize a dramatically larger trade
adjustment.
Finding 2: The within-rm churning of inputs, which we call the \sub-extensive
margin," plays a sizeable role in aggregate trade adjustment.
We now consider changes in the mix of products imported by each rm, a margin we
call the sub-extensive margin. In contrast to the extensive margin of importers or goods at
the economy-wide level, this within-rm margin plays an essential role in aggregate trade
adjustment. This result is depicted in Figure 5, where the sub-extensive margin is dened
rm-by-rm and includes changes in imports for continuing importers due to newly imported
or newly dropped goods (dened, as above, in a variety of ways).14 The black lines plot the
contribution to the total change in imports coming from continuing importer-product com-
binations (\the sub-intensive margin"), while the red lines plot the combined contribution
from within-importer variety churning (\the sub-extensive margin") and entry or exit of
rms themselves (\the extensive margin"). Notice that, in juxtaposition to Figure 4, the
declines in the red and black lines during the crisis are of a similar magnitude in Figures 5(a)
to 5(d). In fact, Figures 5(a) and Figures 5(c) show that the sub-extensive and extensive
margins can explain more than 50 percent of adjustment during the peak crisis quarter. This
is consistent with Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009), who also note signicant
within-rm trade variety churning in U.S. data and conjecture that the welfare eect of
increasing product varieties is underestimated in country-level measures.
Table 3 quanties more precisely the importance of these margins by listing the fraction
of the 69 percent overall decline in dollar imports from 2000 to 2002 as explained by the
dierent denitions of the extensive, sub-extensive, and sub-intensive margins. Table 2
showed that whether the extensive margin is dened as entering/exiting rms or products
(whether HTS-6 or HTS-10) at the country level, it explains little of the decline. By contrast,
the third column of Table 3 shows that within-rm changes in import categories explains a
14We omit separate plots of this disaggregation by end-use but have conrmed that the sub-extensive
margin is signicant for each of the end-use categories (with the automotive sector as the only exception).
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Figure 5: Sub-Extensive Margin
large share up to 45 percent of the decline, even over a two year period, depending on the
product variety denition used.
The importance of the sub-extensive margin (Finding 2) is consistent with the small
role played by the country-level extensive margin (Finding 1) because there is heterogeneity
across rms in the products imported. For example, imagine that before the crisis two
rms, Siemens Argentina and C.T.I., both imported the same semiconductor, but C.T.I.
stopped importing the chip after the peso depreciation. In this case, the country-level product
extensive margin would show no dropped products but there would be sub-extensive margin
adjustment capturing the elimination of C.T.I.'s semiconductor imports.
Figure 6 groups HTS 10-digit products into percentiles based on their size of imports dur-
17Total % Sub-Intensive % Sub-Extensive % Extensive
HTS 6 -69% 0.71 0.18 0.11
HTS 10 -69% 0.56 0.33 0.11
HTS 6 X Cty -69% 0.54 0.35 0.11
HTS 10 X Cty -69% 0.44 0.45 0.11
Table 3: Sub-Intensive, Sub-Extensive, and Extensive Margins, 2000-2002
ing the four quarters ending in September 2001, before the crisis.15 We exclude country-level
extensive margin products that were dropped from Argentina's aggregate import bundle.
The blue circles indicate the share of importer-product combinations in each of these per-
centiles that were dropped during the following four quarters. For any grouping of imported
products, somewhere between 60 and 75 percent of the rms that imported it before the
crisis stopped doing so subsequently. Many imported products which are dropped by a clear
majority of importers are not considered to be dropped varieties at the aggregate level be-
cause a minority of rms continue to import them. Perfect synchronization is required across
importers in terms of the products they add or drop for the product extensive margin to
show up at the country level, an occurrance which would correspond to a blue circle reaching
1.0 in Figure 6.
Finding 3: Smaller importers typically experienced a greater percentage decline
in imports than larger importers. Further, the relative importance of the three
adjustment margins varies with rm size.
The pattern of trade adjustment varies with the size of the importer (as proxied by
the size of imports). Figure 7(a) divides rms into percentiles based on the size of their
imports in 2000.16 The cirlces clearly increase (become less negative) as one moves from the
smallest rms on the left to the larger rms on the right, indicating that the largest buckets
of importers had smaller magnitude declines in their imports from 2000 to 2002.17 This
15Products in the 25th/50th/75th percentiles had initial annual import volumes of about
$30,000/$165,000/$800,000.
16Firms in the 25th/50th/75th percentiles had initial annual import volumes of about
$50,000/$210,000/$770,000.
17Figures 7(a) and 7(b) as well as the regressions in this section all omit the very small share of rms
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Figure 6: Dierent Firms Drop Dierent Products
pattern holds within small and large importers and is driven in part by the greater share of
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Figure 7: Adjustment by Importer Size, 2000{2002
To show this, we can decompose these trade declines into the three margins of adjustment.
Firms that stop importing altogether adjust along the extensive margin. The remaining rms
(nearly all in the smallest 5 percentiles to the left of the plots) that exhibited an increase in imports of more
than 100 percent.
19adjust using a combination of the sub-extensive margin, which is the dropping of imported
varieties (or addition of new ones), and the sub-intensive margin, which is the reduction (or
increase) in ows within a variety with continuing imports. Figure 7(b) plots the share of
each of these three margins in the adjustment of existing combinations of importing rm
and HTS 10-digit products pooled by the percentile of the rm's total imports in 2000 (our
proxy for size).18 The three margins, of course, must sum to 1.
Diamond markers are used to plot extensive margin adjustment, and so a diamond placed
at a y-axis value of 1 would mean that all importers within that percentile exited trade in
2000. The declining diamond marker values indicates that the prevalence of extensive margin
adjustment declines as rm size increases. Dierences between the sub-extensive and sub-
intensive margins are less stark, but the relative importance of the sub-intensive margin is
greatest among the very largest rms, as evidenced by the fact that the square markers
are above the triangle markers for the very largest rms on the right. Heterogeneity in the
importance of these margins underlies the heterogeneity in the degree of trade adjustment
across rms of dierent sizes.19
The fact that the relative importance of the extensive margin and the magnitude of
changes in imports declines with size across essentially all sub-regions of the importer size
distribution suggests that this eect is not driven by industry composition or by the dierence
between multinationals and domestic rms. However, to test this more formally, we run a
series of regressions of the form:
b vi = 0 + 1 ln(vi;2000) + 2sector + 3MNC + "i;
where b vi is the growth of rm i's imports from 2000 to 2002, vi;2000 is the level of rm i's
imports in 2000, \sector" is a dummy variable that corresponds to the 10 dierent primary
sectors identied in the Capital IQ database, and \MNC" is an indicator for when the rm
is a multinational.20 We can only run this regression with the approximately 1,350 rms
18The plot ignores the small value of rm-product combinations that were added in 2002 relative to 2000.
19Some of these patterns are consistent with trade ows being innately lumpy as in Armenter and Koren
(2010). In our analysis below, it makes little dierence whether the patterns are generated by lumpiness or
by xed costs, so long as they generate heterogeneity in trade adjustment and cause rms to drop varieties.
20We are motivated by work such as Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) in considering whether a rm is a
20that match with the Capital IQ database in 2000. This set represents more than half of all
import ows, but the small number of observations rules out inclusion of more covariates. We
run this regression without dummies, with sector dummies, and with both sector dummies
and a dummy for multinationals. The sector dummies pick up a moderate amount of cross-
sector heterogeneity and the multinational dummy suggests that imports by multinationals
dropped about 7 percentage points less than domestic rms. However, the coecient on
size, 1, is positive and signicant at the 1 percent level in all three regressions.21
Finding 4: Assuming imported inputs are combined in a CES aggregator, the
scale of the rm-level extensive margin adjustment implies that the price of
the imported input bundle increased up to 13 percentage points more than the
increase implied by aggregate data.
As is well known, the ideal price index of a CES production function changes due to
both input prices and the number of input varieties. Let Mt be a CES aggregate of varieties
k 2 	t with prices pk;t that combine with an elasticity of substitution 1=(1   ). Following
Feenstra (1994), we write the growth of the unit import cost index b PMt as:
b PMt =
PMt(pk;t;k 2 	t)
PMt 1(pk;t 1;k 2 	t 1)
=

PMt(pk;t;k 2 	t \ 	t 1)
PMt 1(pk;t 1;k 2 	t \ 	t 1)
  P
	t vk;t=
P
	t 1\	t vk;t
P
	t 1 vk;t 1=
P
	t 1\	t vk;t 1
!( 1)=
= b Pf MtFt; (2)
where vk;t is the spending on input k at time t and b Pf Mt is growth in unit costs that ignores
dierences in 	t 1 and 	t. Ft captures the impact on unit costs of a change in varieties.
It also equals the factor by which growth in a conventionally measured price index b Pf M will
multinational since the ability to borrow through internal credit markets might plausibly have mattered
during this episode. Firms with headquarters in foreign countries are classied as multinationals. When a
rm's listed headquarters was in Argentina, research assistants looked in industry databases such as Hoovers
as well as company websites to try determine if any foreign operations existed. If so, we label the company a
multinational. If no foreign operations were found, or if the company does not have a website, we label it a
domestic rm. If anything, this vetting errs on the side of having less multinationals. With this classication,
multinationals account for about three quarters of all imports of rms included in the Capital IQ database.
21We do note that these regressions are more sensitive to specication than would be suggested by Figure
7(a). This is because by including only the largest rms (which match with the Capital IQ database), we
signicantly limit the degree of size variation in the data and omit most extensive margin adjusters.
21dier from growth in the true index b PM.
The rst column of Table 4 lists the aggregate factor F calculated from aggregate data for
2000{2002 for various denitions of product variety and using an elasticity equal to 4, a value
near the middle of a relatively wide range of estimates found in a large literature.22 When the
extensive margin is dened at the country level without taking into account the within-rm
sub-extensive margin, F ranges from 0.992 to 1.012 percent depending on the granularity
with which we dene product categories. None of these corrections is meaningfully dierent
from 1. Consistent with our nding that very little trade adjustment is done via the country-
level extensive margin (Finding 1), the aggregate data suggest there is no meaningful impact
from dropped varieties on the cost of an imported input bundle.23
 = 0:75 F Weighted Average of Fi
Percentiles Included: all all (5,95) (20,80)
HTS 6 1.000 1.087 1.046 1.034
HTS 10 0.992 1.110 1.068 1.060
HTS 6 X Country 1.012 1.163 1.099 1.063
HTS 10 X Country 1.004 1.176 1.096 1.097
Simple Average 1.002 1.134 1.077 1.064
Table 4: Impact of Product Extensive Margin on Imported Input Costs, 2000-2002
Next, we use the information available in the rm-level data to calculate the impact of
the product sub-extensive margin on the cost to each rm of its imported input bundle.
The calculation is identical to that in Equation (2) but adding a rm index i to all val-
ues and yielding: b PMi;t = b Pf Mi;tFi;t. The second through fourth columns of Table 4 give
the trade-weighted average of rm-level factors Fi including all rms, after excluding the
top and bottom 5 percent of correction factors, and after excluding the top and bottom 20
percent of correction factors. We only include rms that had positive import ows in both
22For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) dene a product variety as the interaction of an HTS 10-
digit code and country and obtain a median elasticity estimate of 2.9 and a mean elasticity estimate of 8.2.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) generate an estimate of 8.28, Bernard, Eaton, Kortum, and Jensen (2003) give
an estimate of 3.6, and the estimate in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) equals 4.87.
23This is similar to the nding in Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) who evaluate
the eect of trade liberalization in Costa Rica on increased import variety over the period 1986{1992. They
nd that the gains from importing a larger variety of goods following the liberalization is small because
import spending is concentrated in a few products that were imported before liberalization. They estimate
the F to be 0.997 for consumer goods and 1 for intermediate goods.
222000 and 2002. The impact of the product sub-extensive margin Fi diers somewhat across
specications, product denitions, and treatment of the outliers, but is always economically
signicant. The average value in these columns ranges from 6.4 to 13.4 percent. Consistent
with Finding 2, under the assumption of a CES production function, sub-extensive margin
adjustment driven by within-rm input churning has a large impact on the cost of an im-
ported input bundle. In essence, rather than focusing only on the traditional terms of trade
measured at the country level, we show that one must focus on the rm-level terms of trade.
It is clearly the case that as the level of disaggregation increases more of the adjustment
will be classied as extensive or sub-extensive, so a reasonable question is what is a meaning-
ful level of disaggregation for this exercise? Previous quantication of the product extensive
margin, as in Broda and Weinstein (2006), Broda, Greeneld, and Weinstein (2006), or
Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) has been done at the country or
sector level. This categorization is appropriate under the assumption that all imports are
nal goods consumed by agents with homothetic preferences or are intermediates consumed
by a representative rm. In such a setup, if a good enters the country, it also enters the
representative consumer's consumption bundle or the representative rm's input bundle. By
contrast, our calculations assume that all imported goods are intermediates used only by
the importing rm. In the context of the above example, we assume Siemens' continued
semiconductor imports reects their continued use of the input in production, while C.T.I.'s
dropping of that particular input implies it is no longer using it in production.
In essence, we assume that when a rm does not import a variety it is not using that
variety in production. We believe this is generally the most appropriate assumption, but it
is violated if rms purchase inputs from a domestic distributor who imports it or if rms
draw down holdings of a particular input from inventory.24 As discussed above, the share of
imports due to distributors is low throughout the sample and in fact decreases during the
crisis, ruling out the rst concern.
To get a quantitative sense for the importance of the inventory mechanism for our mea-
surements, we would ideally like to condition rm import behavior on changes in their
24Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) emphasize the importance of the inventory channel in trade
adjustment.
23inventories. Unfortunately, rm or detailed sector level data on inventories are not broadly
available for Argentina. As an alternative, we classify 6-digit HTS sectors into three groups
with low, medium, and high inventory intensities, based on the inventory/sales ratio in the
corresponding 3-digit NAICS manufacturing sector in U.S. Census data from 2000. Figure
8 plots the evolution of the value of imports for the three groups, where the lines are each
normalized to equal one prior to the crisis. The plot shows dierential trajectories through
the crisis period, despite similar import behavior in the runup to the crisis.25 For instance,
comparing 2002:Q1-Q2 with 2001:Q1-Q2, low inventory intensity imports dropped by 53
percent, compared to a 73 percent decline in the other two categories.
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Figure 8: Inventory Intensity and Import Decline
These results show that ignoring inventories may lead to an overstatement of the change
in varieties used in production because the import decline was steepest in sectors presumably
holding large inventories. For this reason, we focus on the 2000{2002 period. Given that
U.S. manufacturing inventories typically equal from 1 to 2 months of sales, this substantially
longer period should alleviate the concern that rms continued producing with inventoried
imported inputs. In our simulations in Section 5.7, we will also take inventories into account
25The average monthly inventory to sales ratio in the three groups equals 1.2, 1.5, and 1.9.
24by reducing the magnitude of the simulated shock such that the drop in imported input use
is consistent with the more muted decline seen in imports of the lowest inventory intensive
categories.
Finally, one might be concerned that the reduction of import varieties need not impact
production costs if there is a similar reduction in nal good varieties. For instance, if each
import variety is used by multiproduct rms to produce a single output variety, then the
reduction in imports can simply follow from a reduction in nal good varieties without
altering in any way the production of continuing goods (though this reduction will still
have welfare eects). The best evidence against such a hypothesis would be data on total
varieties produced, which we do not have. However, we can proxy for the number of varieties
available for domestic consumption by looking at the varieties exported from Argentina over
this period. Figure 9(a) shows that in the aggregate there is a small secular increase in both
import and export varieties from 2000 to 2008. Imported varieties, however, sharply collapsed
during the crisis while export varieties barely changed (and, if anything, increased).26
16000
HTS 10‐digit Varieties (SA)
14000
Import Varieties
10000
12000
8000
Export Varieties
4000
6000
Import Varieties Less Export Varieties
2000
4000
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(a) Aggregate Import and Export Varieties
6
Time Dummies (Number, SA)
Regressions Run with Firm‐Fixed Effects
4
6
Export Varieties
0
2
‐4
‐2
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Import Varieties
‐6
‐4
Import Varieties Less Export Varieties
‐10
‐8
Import Varieties Less Export Varieties
‐12
(b) Import and Export Varieties at Firm Level
Figure 9: Export Varieties did not Decline Along with Import Varieties
Even stronger evidence comes from matching the imports and exports of the same rm
and regressing import varieties, export varieties, and their dierence, on time xed eects
after absorbing rm xed eects. The quarter xed eects from this regression are plotted
in Figure 9(b) and show that while the number of both import and export varieties have
26Plots 9(a) and 9(b) have been seasonally adjusted by removing estimated quarter time-eects.
25a similar long-term growth rate from 1996 to 2008, they diverge dramatically during the
crisis, with rms importing far fewer varieties to support relatively stable numbers of export
varieties.27 This evidence suggests that it was not the case that all (or any) of the decline
in imported input varieties was accompanied by a reduction in nal good varieties.28
In sum, the micro data indicate that dropped product varieties by continuing importers,
the sub-extensive margin, plays an important role in trade adjustment, a conclusion that
could not be inferred from aggregate data. In this sense, studying the micro data is important
for thinking about the appropriate model for trade in intermediate inputs. This in turn is
important for understanding the impact on productivity of trade shocks, something we turn
to in the next sections.
4 Multi-Input Firms, Trade, and Productivity
Consistent with Findings 1-4, we build a model where rms combine labor, capital, and a
continuum of imported and domestically sourced intermediate inputs to produce a unique
variety of good that is used both for nal consumption and as an intermediate input by
other rms. The intermediate input aggregator in the production function displays a \love of
variety" feature with inputs being imperfectly substitutable as in Ethier (1982). Firms dier
in their technologies and they pay a xed cost for each variety of input that is imported.29
This model generates both within-rm adjustment on the sub-extensive margin and het-
erogeneity in trade adjustment across rms. Firms with worse technology will not have
sucient scale to cover the xed costs of importing a larger number of varieties. Conse-
quently, rms will dier in the share of their spending on inputs that are imported. This
27As discussed in the data description, our economy-wide export data have large gaps before 2000, which
is why Figure 9(a) starts in 2000. Our rm-level export data are of lower quality before 2002:Q1, but if the
missing ows reect the omission of representative exporters in their entirety, rather than the omission of
some subsets of given exporters' shipments, then the xed eect regression in Figure 9(b) will be unaected.
At a minimum, the export series from 2002 onward and the entire import series in Figure 9(b) are uncorrupted
by data concerns. Even over this smaller region, the evidence suggests export varieties did not drop along
with import varieties.
28Since we do not have data on purchases of domestic input varieties, we cannot evaluate the impact on
the domestic input component of unit costs of changes (if any) of the number of domestic varieties used.
29Motivated by Finding 1, there is no xed cost for entry into import status and therefore rm entry and
exit will play no role in trade adjustment. We have performed calculations with a xed entry cost calibrated
to match the data and found little dierence with a model without xed entry costs in its implications for
productivity.
26endogenously generates an additional source of variation in the unit cost of production across
rms, in addition to the exogenous technological dierences. We use the model to evaluate
the channels through which an imported input cost shock can aect the welfare relevant
measure of manufacturing productivity. We show that these eects are sizable and when
calibrated to Argentina can generate a productivity decline of over 5 percentage points.
The aggregate data misleadingly imply that dropped input varieties were not an impor-
tant part of adjustment and give no evidence of non-homotheticities in import demand. In
the absence of rm-level data, therefore, the most natural model of trade during the Ar-
gentine crisis would omit xed costs. We compare our benchmark model to this model and
show that the model with sub-extensive margin adjustment exhibits a productivity decline
that is 30 percent, or 1.2 percentage point, larger. Due to mismeasurement associated with
dropped varieties, the implications are even greater for measured productivity.
4.1 Environment
Each domestic manufacturing rm i produces a unique variety of good using the production
function:
Yi = Ai(K
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where Xi is the intermediate input bundle, Ki is capital, Lp;i is the labor input used in
production, and Ai is the rm's exogenous technology. Xi combines a bundle of diverse
intermediate inputs produced domestically, Zi, and another bundle of imported intermediate
inputs, Mi, according to the CES aggregator:
Xi = [Z

i + M

i ]
1
 ;
where the input bundles are themselves CES aggregates:
Zi =
Z
j
z

ijdj
 1

Mi =
Z
k2
i
m

ikdk
 1

:
zij represents rm i's use of domestically produced inputs j, 
i is the set of foreign input
varieties imported by i, and mik is the quantity of imported input k. The elasticity of
27substitution 1=(1 ) is the same within domestic varieties and within foreign varieties, while
1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution between the bundles of imported and domestically
produced inputs.
The output of each domestic rm i is used to produce a nal good gi and as an interme-
diate input zi that is used domestically by other rms. This captures the roundabout nature
of production. There are no exports:
Yi = gi + zi = gi +
Z
j
zjidj:
The aggregate nal good G is formed by aggregating all the individual nal goods gi:
G =
Z
i
g

idi
 1

;
where 0 <  < 1 and 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution across the dierent varieties
used in producing the nal good.30
There is a xed cost f denominated in units of labor that is an increasing function of
the measure of varieties imported. The presence of these xed costs is consistent with the
empirical evidence we presented earlier and the evidence in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2009) and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009). Total xed costs can be written as:
F(j
ij) = f j
ij
 ;
where f > 0;  > 0. We denote the labor used to pay xed costs for rm i as Lf;i. This spec-
ication implies that all rms will import at least some positive quantities. Consistent with
Finding 1, rm entry into and exit from import status will not be important for aggregate
trade adjustment.
30For simplicity we assume that the elasticity of substitution across domestic varieties in producing good
j is the same as across domestic varieties in producing the nal good. This will imply that the elasticity of
demand faced by rm i is a constant equal to 1=(1 ): If the elasticities dier then the elasticity of demand
faced by rm i is a weighted average of the elasticity of the nal good demand and of the intermediate input
demand, where the weights reect the relative shares of output going to the nal demand sector compared
to intermediate input demand.
284.2 Firm's Problem
Firms engage in monopolistic competition. Each rm i chooses Ki, Lp;i, and the vector fzijg,
given the price of labor w, the rental price of capital r, and the set of domestic intermediate
input prices fpjg. They also choose the set of imported varieties 
i and the amount of each
variety k, mik.
We assume that the price of all imported goods is pm, and since all imported varieties are
identical, the quantity of each imported foreign variety will be the same, mi.31 The rm's
unit cost function is then:
Ci =
1
(1   )1 
P
1 
V P

Xi
Ai
; (4)
where PV =  (1   ) (1 )rw1  is a constant that does not vary across rms, and:
PXi =

P

 1
Z + PMi

 1
  1

:
The domestic input price index: PZ =

R
i p

 1
i di
  1

is the same for all rms, while the
imported input price index:
PMi =
Z
k2
i
pm

 1
  1

= pm j
ij
 1
 ;
diers across rms to the extent that they import a dierent measure of varieties j
ij. The
larger the measure of imported varieties used the lower the intermediate input cost index,
all else equal. The number of imported input varieties used by each rm can vary, while the
number of domestic input varieties remains xed. We make this assumption because xed
costs (if any) required for buying domestic varieties are likely much smaller than those for
importing goods and because we lack data on domestic varieties used for production.
Firm i's demand for production workers Lp;i, capital Ki, domestically sourced inputs
31We make this simplifying assumption because the main comparative static we consider is the eect
of the Argentine peso devaluation on import purchases. This large common shock likely dominated any
idiosyncratic movement in import prices.
29fzijg, and imported inputs fmig are given by the rst-order conditions:
wLp;i = (1   )(1   )CiYi;
rKi = (1   )CiYi;
PXiXi = CiYi; (5)
zij =

pj
PZ
 1
 1 
PZ
PXi
 1
 1
Xi for each j; and
mi =

pm
PMi
 1
 1 
PMi
PXi
 1
 1
Xi:
The demand faced by domestic rm i for its output is the sum of nal demand gi and
intermediate demand zi:
gi +
Z
j
zjidj =

pi
PG
 1
 1
G +
Z
j

pi
PZ
 1
 1 
PZ
PXj
 1
 1
Xjdj;
where PG is the CES price index for nal varieties gi. The price set by rm i is pi = Ci=.
Firm i then chooses 
i to maximize prots net of the cost of importing varieties:

i = argmax

i
fi   wF(j
ij)g;
where i are prots gross of all xed costs.
It follows that rms with better technology will import a larger measure of varieties
as long as the second-order conditions for an interior solution for 
i are satised.32 Since
varieties are homogenous the identity of each specic imported variety is indeterminate. The
model is then consistent with rms dropping disjoint sets of varieties that are generally not
dropped in the aggregate, as was the case in the empirical evidence.
Dene i 
PZZi
PXiXi to be the share of domestic inputs in total spending on intermediates.
i is decreasing in Ai. The domestic input price index can be expressed as:
32The second order condition requires
(1 )
(1 )  +


1   

1 

( 1)
 (PMi=PXi)

 1 < 0: This is satised
as long as  is suciently high. (PMi=PXi)

 1 equals the share of intermediate input spending on imported
inputs and therefore belongs to the interval (0;1).
30PZ =
(rw1 )
()
1
1 
Q
  1
1 
 ;
where
Q =
"
X
i

(
 1
 )

1 
i A

1 
i
# 1 

;
and  = (1   )1  ((1   )1 )
1 .
The price index therefore depends on the joint distribution of rm-level technologies
Ai and import shares (1   i), which captures the heterogeneity in unit costs of production
arising from exogenous dierences in Ai and endogenous dierences in i. Since high Ai rms
have lower i they have lower unit costs of production. This cost advantage is decreasing
in the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign inputs, . The revenue, prots,
and value added will be more dispersed in this environment than in one without xed costs.
5 Productivity
The goal of this section is to evaluate the impact of a foreign input cost shock on the
productivity of the manufacturing sector and the resulting implications for the welfare of
a representative agent in the economy. We measure rm level productivity PRi using the
Solow residual:
lnPRi = lnY
V A
i   sLilnLi   sKilnKi; (6)
where lnLi, lnKi, and lnY V A
i denote the growth rates of labor, capital input, and
value-added of the rm, and sLi and sKi denote shares of labor and capital in value added.
Industry level value added is just a weighted sum of rm level value added:33
lnPR = lnY
V A   sLlnL   sKlnK; (7)
where lnY V A = !i
P
i lnY V A
i , sLlnL =
P
i !isLilnLi, sKlnK =
P
i !isLklnKi,
and !i 
 
P V A
i Y V A
i

=
 
P V AY V A
denotes rm i's share of industry value added. Note that
33Industry-level factor shares multiplied by growth in industry-level inputs can be written as the value-
added share weighted sum of the corresponding rm-level object because all rms pay the same factor prices.
31this measure of the Solow residual, often referred to as the \modied" Solow residual, has
factor shares that need not sum to one. As highlighted by Basu and Fernald (2002) and Basu,
Pascali, Schiantarelli, and Serven (2011), this is the welfare relevant measure of productivity.
5.1 Firm-level and Sector-level Productivity
The standard denition of value-added growth is:
lnY
V A
i 
lnYi   sY
XilnXi
1   sY
Xi
;
where sY
Xi = (PXiXi)=(piYi) is the share of intermediate input spending in total revenues (as
opposed to in value added). Equations (4) and (5), together with the optimality of constant
markups, imply that sY
Xi =  for all rms. In the appendix, we follow steps similar to those
in Basu and Fernald (2002) with the distinction that we have labor that is used for xed
costs as well as for production and show that one can use a rst-order approximation to
express changes in the productivity of rm i as:
lnPRi =
(1   )
(1   )

lnVi +

1   
(lnXi   lnYi)

 
(1   )
(1   )
sLi
 
1   !Lp;i

lnLf;i + lnAi=(1   ): (8)
We write lnVi  sKilnKi + sLilnLi for the percent change in use of primary inputs
and use !Lp;i  Lp;i=Li to denote the share of rm i's labor that is used in production.
Equation (8) allows us to describe how a generic shock will impact rm-level productivity.
First, productivity will change with the scale of production lnVi since rms have pricing
power and  < 1. This follows because value added growth exceeds the sum of shares of
payments going to primary factors times input growth in the presence of mark-ups. Why
is this decline in productivity relevant from a welfare perspective? When consumers are
price takers, the payments to primary inputs corresponds to the welfare loss to consumers of
providing more labor (foregoing leisure) and more capital (foregoing current consumption)
and the value added growth captures the welfare gain in consumption in exchange. In
the presence of mark-ups, the marginal rate of transformation exceeds the marginal rate of
32substitution. A decline in scale is therefore associated with a welfare loss in consumption that
exceeds the welfare gain from a reduction in labor and capital. The fact that in the presence
of mark-ups productivity is impacted by scale eects even when technology is unchanged
goes back to Hall (1988, 1990). This argument is developed more generally and linked to
welfare in Basu and Fernald (2002) and Basu, Pascali, Schiantarelli, and Serven (2011).
Second, changes in the intensity of intermediate input use, lnXi lnYi, will have an
impact on productivity when rms have pricing power for the same reasons as changes in the
scale of production do. With positive markups, the opportunity cost of using up inputs is
exceeded by the gains from their contribution to value added. Importantly, in the presence of
intermediate inputs,  > 0, even small deviations from  = 1 can have signicant eects on
productivity. Below, we relate changes in this term to changes in the share of intermediate
input spending on domestic inputs, i.
A third eect on rm productivity arises from changes in the use of labor for xed costs
lnLf;i. Equation (3) shows that xed labor has no direct eect on output. Therefore,
all else equal, a decline in its use has a positive impact on this welfare-relevant measure of
productivity.
Finally, the fourth term refers to changes in the technology Ai of each rm. We hold
technology xed by assumption and therefore shut down this last mechanism for productivity
changes.
It is clear from equation (8) that shocks to imported input costs will have a rst order
impact on rm productivity in our economy. This result diers from Kohli (2004) and Kehoe
and Ruhl (2008) who assume perfect competition and conclude that terms of trade shocks
have no rst-order eect on productivity. The dierence is that we consider the case when
rms have pricing power. In the limiting case of no pricing power when  ! 1 we also obtain
the result that there are no rst order eects on productivity. This is seen in equation (8)
as the rst term collapses to zero if  = 1 and the second term will equal zero if there are
no xed costs.
In the presence of xed costs there will be heterogeneous adjustments in each of the non-
technology terms of equation (8). Because of dierential adjustments on the sub-extensive
margin across rms of dierent sizes, the change in PMi will vary across rms. This will
33imply variation in changes in the unit cost of production and consequently on the scale
of production. In parallel, heterogeneity in sub-extensive margin adjustment will bring
heterogeneous adjustment in xed costs.
Next, we consider the impact on sectoral productivity of a common change in the cost
of imported inputs in our model, designed to capture the eect of a large nominal exchange
rate devaluation that increases the relative price of imported to domestically sourced inputs.
We adopt a partial equilibrium framework that holds factor prices (w, r) xed and write the
impact on sector-level productivity of an increase in the relative price of imported inputs
as:34
lnPR =

1   
1   

lnV (9)
+

1   
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1   
1   
 
1   
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
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i
!ilni
#
(11)
 

1   
(1   )lnpm: (12)
The rst term on the right hand side of line (9) captures the overall scale eect on
productivity of the change in factor input use lnV 
P
i !ilnVi. The increase in foreign
input costs in our economy generates an increase in the unit cost of production for rms that
in turn raises the price of each rm's output relative to sectors that do not use imported
inputs. This reduces the demand for the industry and consequently generates a decline in
the usage of K and L.35 Firm sub-extensive margin adjustment also generates movement in
L by changing the use of labor associated with xed costs.
34As discussed in the appendix, these expressions rely on the approximation ln(1   i) =  
i
1 ilni,
which is valid for small shocks. In the simulation section we do not use this approximation because we study
large shocks.
35Note that overall nal good demand for domestic rms necessarily declines. However, rms that relied
less on imported inputs are less impacted by the shock causing their share and output to increase. As
rms shift from foreign to domestic inputs the relative share of spending on domestic intermediate inputs
increases. The net level eect on intermediate input demand depends on both the derived demand eect for
intermediate inputs following the decline in overall nal demand (negative) and the increase in the relative
demand for domestic versus imported inputs (positive). In Section 5.3 we obtain a net decline in total
manufacturing demand/output consistent with that documented in the data when parameters are calibrated
to match key moments in the data.
34The next set of terms arise from heterogeneity in trade adjustment due to the interaction
of xed costs and heterogeneous technologies. The term in line (10) can in principle be
positive or negative and reects the impact of non-homothetic import demand. Because
rms adjust dierentially, the price of their output will adjust dierentially and market
shares will change endogenously (i.e. ln!i 6= 0). As discussed above, trade (or changes
in trade) induces a shift in market shares relative to the exogenous technology distribution.
Lines (11) and (12) capture the impact of adjustments in import shares across the entire
distribution of rms.
It is useful to compare productivity and welfare in our benchmark model to the case
where there are no xed costs in importing varieties. With no xed costs, each rm imports
the same foreign varieties and spends the same cost share on imports. Trade has the same
impact on all rms' unit cost of production and consequently the full distribution of market
shares !i remains unchanged in response to import cost shocks. Firms with dierent tech-
nologies might operate at dierent scales but this heterogeneity is irrelevant for all aggregate
measures. For example, lnVi is the same across rms. In this case, line (10) is equal to 0.
Combining lines (11) with (12), we arrive at a term
 

1   
1   

1   
1   
ln;
where  
P
i !ii is the industry average of intermediate input spending on domestic inputs.
This expression resembles the nding in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011),
where primary factors are in xed supply and therefore lnV = 0. The impact of a change
pm is an increasing function of the share of intermediates in production , a decreasing
function of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign intermediates , and
is summarized by this scaled movement in ln. In models where L and K are exogenously
xed and where there is no change in the market share of continuing importers, the impact
on productivity and welfare is a simple linear function of the percent change in spending on
domestic intermediate inputs.
In the case with xed costs and heterogenous rms, the terms in lines (10), (11), and (12)
do not simplify and the impact on productivity depends on the full distribution of individual
35rm responses. This is because, consistent with Finding 3, rms respond to the same shock
with a dierent share of their adjustment due to the sub-intensive and sub-extensive margins.
Firms with more product sub-extensive margin adjustment see import volume decline more
than rms with more sub-intensive margin adjustment. Line (10) reects the dierential
changes in rm shares of value added and line (11) does not simplify because it is no longer
the case that the change in the aggregate import share equals the import-weighted sum of
changes in rm-level import shares. Also note that the sign of expression (11) is always
positive. This in part reects the positive impact on productivity from the savings of xed
cost labor implied by the shift from foreign to domestic inputs.
5.2 Measured Productivity
In the previous sections we focused on the impact of an import collapse on the welfare
relevant measure of productivity under the assumption that the measurement of prices and
quantities properly accounted for changes in input varieties. As pointed out by Feenstra
(1994), however, statistical agencies in all countries employ matched-model price indices
which do not adjust for changing import varieties. Therefore, if trade collapsed in part due
to the product sub-extensive margin, and if production involves CES aggregation as in our
model, these agencies would underestimate the true rise in import prices. If a matched
model price index were used to calculate Xi from the observed spending on inputs (PXiXi),
it would result in an overestimate of intermediate input use which would lead to a further
decline in measured productivity.
Under these assumptions, we write the measured change in productivity as:
ln g PR = lnPR  

1   
1   
1   
X
i
!iln(PXi=e PXi);
where e PXi is the mismeasured price index that does not account for the change in the
varieties of imported inputs. This measurement implies a positive movement in (PXi=e PXi)
and a greater decline in measured than in actual productivity. In this sense, our rm-level
data reveal that dropped import varieties are not only important for understanding the
actual change in productivity but are additionally important for the practical measurement
36of it.
The above analytical expressions suggest that important dierences in productivity emerge
in response to the same shocks depending on the underlying structure of the model. Our
rm-level data and Findings 1-4 motivated the structure of our benchmark model presented
in Section 4. In the absense of simulations of the benchmark and any alternative model,
however, it is hard to determine when productivity will be higher or lower in response to
any given shock or if these dierences are signicant. We therefore turn now to simulations
to compare the outcomes for productivity in models with and without xed costs.
5.3 Simulation
We numerically simulate the model with a simple algorithm in which we specify the number
of domestic rms, the distribution of their technologies G(Ai), the xed cost function F(j
ij),
an initial value for the import price pm, and the set of parameters f;;;;b;;w;rg. To
allow for some substitution away from the manufacturing sector, we specify utility as a CES
bundle of both the manufacturing good and a non-traded good, [!G + (1   !)C

N]
1=, and
additionally specify xed values for C, PN, and !. Equilibrium in this partial equilibrium
setup is simply the price of output and the number of imported varieties, fpi;
ig, such
that the rm's rst-order conditions are satised given nal demand in the economy. The
numerical algorithm used to solve for the equilibrium is detailed in the appendix.
5.4 Calibration
We now describe our calibration of the most important parameters used in our benchmark
simulation, though we later report results for varying parameter values. We set  =  = 0:75,
corresponding to an elasticity of 4, the value used in Section 3. We choose  = 2=3, consistent
with the 1997 input-output table for Argentina obtained from the OECD.36 Table 5 lists these
as well as the other parameter values used in our benchmark simulation, which simulates an
industrial sector with 1,000 rms.
36The OECD input-output table contains 48 sectors of which we classify 21 as manufacturing. We nd sim-
ilar values for 1998{2002 using Argentina's annual manufacturing census (the Encuesta Industrial Annual).
The stability of this share corroborates our Cobb-Douglas functional form assumption.
37  b    f 
0.75 0.75 1 2/3 1/3 2 0.0075 0.8
w r C PN ! ppre
m b pm pre post
50 50 1x108 0.96 0.2 1.70 1.15 0.83 0.89
Table 5: Baseline Simulation Parameters
We can directly measure the share of input spending on domestic goods, , for 1997
from the input-output table, but Argentina has not released a version for subsequent years.
The annual manufacturing census gives annual input spending by manufacturers, though,
so we can approximate  in future years by assuming that the growth in manufacturing
spending on imported inputs follows the growth in total imports.37 This results in a pre-
crisis minimum value of 0.83 for  (i.e. pre = 0:83). We do not formally estimate the xed
cost function, but choose a functional form and parameterization which, in conjunction with
other parameter values, both satises the second-order condition listed in footnote 32 and
allows us to qualitatively replicate the ndings from the empirical section.38 Given the level
of expenditures on the manufactured good, the wage, the rental rate on capital, and the
xed cost function, we choose the initial unit import price pm to match pre.
Our analysis does not require a parametric form of the productivity distribution, so we
choose Ai manually, which allows us to better target various moments of the import share
distribution. The dotted red line of Figure 10 plots the simulated import cdf, which is a
close match with that in the solid blue line plotted from the Argentine data in 2000.39
We choose values for  and ! and set the non-manufactured good price PN so that
the initial share of the manufacturing sector in total consumption spending equals about
26 percent, the level of manufacturing value added in consumption in Argentina's national
accounts prior to the recession. We then hold these and all other parameter values xed and
37We have also tried growing imported input spending by the import spending on capital goods, interme-
diate goods, fuels, and parts of capital goods as reported in Argentina's annual manufacturing census. The
results do not meaningfully change.
38In the base period of our simulation, spending on the xed cost averages about 14 percent of the total
xed and variable spending on each import. This is only a bit above the equivalent 11 percent number given
as the upper end of the range in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010).
39In principle, we could have tried to match every point on the cdf, but restrictions due to computational
speed prevented us from doing this. We believe our match of the distribution at the 10, 20, 50, and 95
percent y-axis values is sucient to capture the relative importance of large, medium, and small rms in our
simulated economy.
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Figure 10: Concentration of Imports in the Data (2000) and in the Simulation
shock pm such that the share of manufacturing input spending allocated to imported goods,
1 , decreases to 0.11 (i.e. post = 0:89), consistent with the 2002 value in our calculations
with the Argentine data. We do not aim to explain objects outside of the manufacturing
sector, such as real GDP growth. As such, the values of PN, !, and  are not important
for our simulation other than their determination of the initial share of overall consumption
spending on the manufacturing sector that uses imported inputs and the real decline in
manufacturing value added.40 Given these values and the shock to pm, the implied reduction
in real manufacturing value added equals 17 percent, equal to the real decline of industrial
production in the Argentine national accounts over this same period.
5.5 Simulated Adjustment Patterns
We now simulate an import price shock in our model and report results in order to achieve
three goals. First, we wish to demonstrate that the model can reproduce Findings 2-4 (it
by assumption reproduces Finding 1). Second, we wish to evaluate the scale of productiv-
40For example, exogenously imposing a change in aggregate nal consumption C or changing the parameter
 would be isomorphic for the objects in the manufacturing sector we focus on.
39ity changes brought about from the shock. Third, we use the simulations to demonstrate
the dierential response of our economy, which is designed to reproduce the large product
sub-extensive margin observed in our rm-level data, compared with an economy without
signicant extensive margin adjustments, as would be consistent with aggregate data.
Finding 1 documented that the rm extensive margin played little role and given there
is no xed cost of importing per se (only a per-variety xed cost), the rm extensive margin
plays no role in trade adjustment in our simulated model.41 Sub-extensive margin adjustment
in our model, however, contributes 47 percent of the simulated decline in exports, with the
remainder due to the sub-intensive margin. This compares with the sub-extensive margin
contributing 45 percent and the sub-intensive margin contributing 44 percent in the data,
as we showed in Finding 2. The sub-extensive and sub-intensive margins are comparably
important with each other in both our simulated model and in the data.
Finding 3 noted that larger rms (proxied by the size of their pre-crisis imports) exhibit
on average a smaller percentage decline in trade than do smaller rms and that the sub-
intensive margin played a greater role for larger rms. In the data this result is driven by
the reduced prevalence of extensive and sub-extensive margin adjusters among larger rms.
Figure 11 plots these moments of trade adjustment against importer size and conrms these
ndings hold in our simulated data. The dierences between large and small rms in these
respects are more muted in our simulation than in the data. This emerges in large part
because we have omitted the extensive margin in our model. If we introduced a xed
importing cost which generated the exit from trade among small rms, dispersion in these
gures would more closely resemble the magnitudes witnessed in the data.42
Figure 11(a) shows that larger rms in the simulation adjust less and Figure 11(b) shows
that a greater share of this adjustment for the largest rms comes from the sub-intensive
margin. In general the relationship between rm size and the elasticities of response to cost
shocks depends on the model's details, parameter values, and distributional assumptions,
41We could, of course, easily add an initial xed cost to increase the role of the rm extensive margin.
Because these rms will be the smallest in the economy, this change would have no meaningful impact on
any other reported result.
42We also note that while only the smallest rms would adjust along the extensive margin in such an
exercise, any randomness (such as technology shocks) introduced to this environment would spread these
extensive margin adjusters across the size distribution.
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Figure 11: Adjustment and Size in Simulation
discussed further in the appendix.43 In our simulation, rms with worse technology (smaller
size) have a higher i. A higher i on one hand increases the responsiveness to a shock of the
number of foreign varieties imported (because the rm with a higher i has a higher price
movement of PMi relative to PXi). On the other hand it lowers the responsiveness to a shock
of the optimal price and therefore demand, which in turn aects the demand for inputs. The
rst eect will dominate if:

1   
>

1   
;
which is the case with our benchmark parameters.
Finally, Finding 4 measured the implied change in the unit cost of each rm's CES import
bundle and found that a trade-weighted average of these changes ranged between 6 and 13
percent, depending on the denition of \variety" used. We calculate this identical object in
our simulation and nd a value of 8.9 percent, highly consistent with the empirical range.
This conrms that the economic impact of the simulated sub-extensive margin adjustment
also resembles that found in the rm-level data.
43In Chaney (2008) the elasticity depends on the specics of the distribution function across imported
varieties. In the case of Pareto the elasticity is shown to be invariant to rm productivity. In our setup the
distribution is degenerate because all varieties are identical.
415.6 Simulated Baseline Declines in Manufacturing Productivity
Figure 12 shows how lni and lnPRi vary across the size distribution of rms. The
rms with the best technology import the most and are at the right of the plot. Their initial
i values were lowest and the percent increase in those values is greatest. This results in the
largest productivity decline for those rms.
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Figure 12: Changes in Domestic Input Share and Productivity
We next provide estimates of sectoral level productivity in Table 6. For each simula-
tion, we report three values: lnPR, lnF, and ln g PR. We start with results from our
benchmark model with xed costs and roundabout production, reported in row (1), which
is labeled \Benchmark." As described above, the foreign input cost shock in this simulation
generates an increase in the manufacturing sector's  from 0.83 to 0.89 and generates a
decline in manufacturing productivity, lnPR, of 5.5 percent. If we take into account the
mismeasurement due to ignoring the 8.9 percentage point increase in import bundle prices
due to dropped varieties, the magnitude of the mismeasured productivity decline, ln g PR,
is 6.6 percent.
We now compare the productivity estimates in the benchmark simulation to those that
would be obtained under alternative model assumptions and subject to the same size import
42lnPR lnF ln g PR
(1) Benchmark -0.055 0.089 -0.066
(2) No Fixed Costs -0.043 0.000 -0.043
(3) No Roundabout Production -0.026 0.119 -0.038
(4)  = 0:50 -0.068 0.037 -0.073
(5)  = 0:90 -0.017 0.003 -0.017
(6)  = 0:50,  = 0:90 -0.028 0.0025 -0.028
(7) Adjusting For Inventories, post = 0:86 -0.024 0.034 -0.029
(8) No Capital Goods, post = 0:87 -0.033 0.049 -0.040
Table 6: Simulation Results: Productivity
price shock lnpm as in the benchmark case. These results are reported in rows (2)-(6) of
Table 6.44
We start by comparing rows (1) and (2) to answer the question of how a shock impacts
productivity in a model which incorporates a sub-extensive margin (the benchmark) com-
pared to the identical shock in a model without one (no xed costs). The decline in import
shares is smaller in row (2) compared with that in the benchmark case in row (1), and none
of the losses are associated with less import varieties. Even accounting for the savings of la-
bor associated with declines in payment of xed costs, welfare relevant productivity declines
by 1.2 percentage points more when we take into account the sub-extensive margin. This
dierence roughly doubles if one considers the impact of sub-extensive margin adjustment
on measured productivity. The jump from approximately zero to -4.3 percent, which comes
from the move from perfect competition to imperfect competition is clearly larger than the
additional movement from the sub-extensive margin. However, this margin does contribute
an additional 30 percent.
44In these simulations we adjust PN and pm to match the initial share of spending on manufactures and
 to the benchmark case.
43Row (3) evaluates the quantitative importance of roundabout production. We specify
that the price of domestic inputs PZ is xed at the same initial value as in the benchmark
simulation and is completely insensitive to changes in the import price pm. All other features
of the model are the same as in the benchmark case. In this environment rms will sub-
stitute more than in our benchmark case to the domestically produced intermediate inputs.
The increase in unit cost of production is therefor lower and manufacturing value added falls
falls by less than in the benchmark case. The resulting productivity decline of 2.6 percent is
roughly half the magnitude of the decline in the benchmark case, even though both simula-
tions are calibrated to the same initial conditions and are exposed to the same shock. This
highlights the importance of this mechanism for amplifying the shock.
5.7 Robustness
In this sub-section, we re-simulate our system with a number of dierent parameter values or
assumptions used in our empirical analysis to determine the sensitivity of our productivity
and welfare estimates. The results are reported in rows (4)-(8) of Table 6.
Rows (4) through (6) evaluate the sensitivity to the key elasticity parameters  and .
Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2010), in a model with very similar structure to ours, empha-
size estimates suggesting  < . We consider this possibility by simulating the model with
 = 0:5, corresponding to an elasticity between domestic and foreign varieties of 2. Because
the importance of the sub-extensive margin is decreasing in  the decline in productivity in
response to the same shock is larger than the benchmark case and close to 7%. Row (5)
shows that productivity declines by 1.7 percent if we increase  to 0.90, corresponding to a
high elasticity within domestic and within foreign varieties of 10. Row (6) shows that the
combination of making the between-elasticity lower and the within-elasticity higher yields a
productivity decline of about 2.8 percent.
Next, we consider the impact of inventories. As shown in Figure 8, the Argentine rms
in industries which appear to hold the least inventories relative to their sales reduced their
imports by signicantly less than typical rms. If we re-calculate the value in the 2002
Argentine data of the aggregate share of input spending on domestic goods  under the
44assumption that aggregate import growth is scaled down to match the experience of these
least inventory intensive sectors, we obtain the value post = 0:86 rather than the benchmark
post-crisis value of 0.89. We therefore introduce a simulated decline in the import price
of a magnitude that generates this more limited movement in . Row (7) reports that
this produces a productivity decline that is a bit less than half as large as that seen in
the benchmark case but which we still consider to be economically signicant. Relatedly,
row (8) considers a shock that is calibrated to the change in  found in the data when we
exclude import spending on capital goods. This implies a value for post equal to 0.87 and a
productivity decline of 3.3 percentage points.
In sum, we nd that an imported input cost shock generates meaningful declines in
productivity across several specications.
6 The Decline and Recovery of TFP in Argentina
We have demonstrated how aggregate productivity can decline as rms substitute from
imported to domestic input use. The shift in spending toward domestic sources is captured
by movement in , while the importance of dropped import varieties for raising rm unit
costs is captured by F. In this section we correlate our measures of changes in  and F
with independent estimates of TFP for Argentina. These independent TFP estimates dier
slightly from the welfare-relevant measure of productivity we use in this paper, but the basic
time-series properties of these should be similar. We show that the chronology of our  and
F measures is consistent with the chronology of TFP movements, both during the period
when TFP declined and when it recovered.
Figure 13 includes plots of two estimates of productivity in Argentina as measured by
ARKLEMS, an Argentine project that measures productivity following the methodology
of the WORLD KLEMS initiative and of Coremberg (2009). The solid black line plots
\unadjusted" TFP, which the author says corresponds to the typical methodology used in
Argentine and Latin American TFP estimation as well as by other studies such as Kydland
and Zarazaga (2002). The blue dashed line plots what they label \strict" TFP, which includes
45adjustments of labor quality and capital utilization.45 We should point out that the adjusted
TFP measure is done with limited data and restrictive assumptions and may therefore be
less reliable. .1.12.14.16.18.2 .9.9511.051.11996199820002002200420062008
TFP (ARKLEMS) TFP (ARKLEMS, Adjusted)
Input Variety Effect Imported Input Share (1-g, Right Axis)
Figure 13: Time-series Paths of Productivity, Dropped Varieties, Import Shares
Both TFP series are normalized to equal 1 in 2000 and indicate that TFP began to decline
in 1999. The unadjusted series exhibits moderate to large declines through 2001, with its
largest decline occurring in 2002. A rapid recovery of this measure of TFP then begins in
2003. The adjusted series declines more modestly in 2002 and continues this decline in 2003
before exhibiting a more mild recovery in 2004 and 2005. The unadjusted TFP series nishes
2006 (the last available ARKLEMS estimate) only slightly below its pre-recession level while
45We do not plot the TFP measures from Sandleris and Wright (2011) here as those estimates end in
2002. Our results are consistent with their estimate from continuing establishments, the relevant comparison
group for us because all of the adjustment in trade takes place within continuing rms. This measure of
TFP declines most steeply in 2001 but continues to meaningfully decline in 2002.
46the adjusted series remains depressed.
The long-dashed green line plots our estimates of (1 ), the share of imported inputs in
total input spending. The decline in (1   ) from a peak of 0.17 to the trough value of 0.11
corresponds to the values in Table 5 of pre = 0:83 and post = 0:89. Though much of the
substitution away from imported inputs occurs in very late 2001 and 2002 due to movement
in the exchange rate, this substitution in fact started as early as 1999. This is consistent
with our model because in the presence of xed costs of importing, rms will spend less on
imported inputs as total demand declines, even holding xed the relative price of imports.
The series stabilizes in 2003 and then recovers starting in 2004.46
The short-dashed red line plots our estimates of the impact of dropped import varieties
on the unit cost of production F using the same methodology as those done in Table 4.
We consider idiosyncratic rm-specic changes in the cost of imported inputs in each year
relative to the base year of 2000 due to changes in the mix of 10-digit inputs by country
of origin. This series has a small decline in 2001, a larger decline in 2002, and a recovery
starting in 2003.47 The time variation in F therefore displays a positive correlation with that
of TFP.
While clearly there were many other negative shocks during the Argentine crisis, the
time-series patterns do oer corroboration that the mechanisms highlighted in our paper
may well have been salient for TFP in Argentina over this period.
7 Conclusion
Two prominent features of large macroeconomic crises are the collapse in imports and the
large decline in measured TFP. We use transaction-level trade data from the Argentine crisis
of 2001{2002 to characterize, mechanically, how this reduction in trade occurred and how
46Calculation of the imported input share in this plot diers slightly from the methodology described in
Section 5.3 because we need data for years for which annual manufacturing censuses are not available. We
therefore use data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators to compare growth in manufacturing
spending on imports to growth in manufacturing value added, rather than total input spending, in order
to grow the earlier series forward. This implicitly assumes that, as in the model, the ratio of spending on
inputs to the sector's value added remains constant. We compared estimates of  for 1998-2003 using this
new methodology to estimates using that described in Section 5.3 and found them to be highly similar.
47In fact, this measure also shows a small downward trend from 1998 to 2000, but less condence should
be placed in the 1998 and 1999 values for this measure due to the gap in our data over this period.
47the decline inuences a welfare-relevant measure of productivity. We nd that the extensive
margin of trade at the country level, where previous importers stop importing or product
varieties are dropped by all importers, is not quantitatively signicant. However, the micro-
data allow us to observe quantitatively signicant within-rm churning of inputs that we
call the sub-extensive margin. Finally, the scale and type of trade adjustment diers with
the size of the importer, generating heterogeneous changes in their unit costs of production.
Motivated by these empirical ndings, we build a heterogeneous rm model with round-
about production and xed costs of importing. The model replicates the above empirical
ndings and generates economically signicant declines in productivity. When calibrated to
reproduce the lack of extensive margin adjustment observable in aggregate data, the impact
on productivity diers meaningfully.
Crises such as the one Argentina experienced surely involve multiple shocks, and no one
channel can explain its entire economic impact. Our analysis suggests, however, that the
reduced use of imported intermediate inputs is a signicant contributor to the productivity
and welfare losses experienced during crises.
48References
Albornoz, F., H. C. Pardo, G. Corcos, and E. Ornelas (2010): \Sequential Exporting,"
Working Paper.
Alessandria, G., J. Kaboski, and V. Midrigan (2010): \Inventories, Lumpy Trade, and Large
Devaluations," American Economic Review, 100(5), 2304.
Amiti, M., and J. Konings (2007): \Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productiv-
ity," American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Arkolakis, C., A. Costinot, and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2011): \New Trade Models, Same
Old Gains?," American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Arkolakis, C., S. Demidova, P. Klenow, and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2008): \Endogenous
Variety and the Gains from Trade," American Economic Review, 98.
Armenter, R., and M. Koren (2010): \A Balls-and-Bins Model of Trade," Working Paper.
Basu, S., and J. Fernald (2002): \Aggregate Productivity and Aggregate Technology," Euro-
pean Economic Review, 46, 963{991.
Basu, S., L. Pascali, F. Schiantarelli, and L. Serven (2011): \Productivity and Welfare of
Nations," Working Paper.
Bernard, A., J. Eaton, S. Kortum, and J. B. Jensen (2003): \Plants and Productivity in
International Trade," American Economic Review, 93(4), 1268.
Bernard, A., B. Jensen, S. Redding, and P. Schott (2009): \The Margins of U.S. Trade,"
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.
Bernard, A., B. Jensen, and P. K. Schott (2009): \Importers, Exporters, and Multinationals:
A Portrait of Firms in the U.S. that Trade Goods," in Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from
Micro Data, ed. by T. Dunne, J. Jensen, and M. Roberts. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Broda, C., J. Greenfield, and D. Weinstein (2006): \From Groundnuts to Globalization: A
Structural Estimate of Trade and Growth," Working Paper.
Broda, C., and D. Weinstein (2006): \Globalization and the Gains from Variety," Quarterly
Journal of Economics.
Burstein, A., and J. Cravino (2010): \Trade Liberalizations and Measured Real GDP in
Models of International Trade," Working Paper.
Burstein, A., M. Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo (2005): \Large Devaluations and Real Exchange
Rates," Journal of Political Economy, 113(4), 742{784.
Chaney, T. (2008): \Distorted Gravity: The intensive and extensive margins of International
Trade," American Economic Review, 98(4).
49Coremberg, A. (2009): \Measuring source of growth of an unstable economy. Argentina: pro-
ductivity and productive factors by asset type and industry. Methods and series. (in Spanish),"
Estudios y Perspectivas, ECLAC Buenos Aires Oce.
Desai, M., F. Foley, and J. Hines (2004): \A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure
Choice and Internal Capital Markets," Journal of Finance, 59(6), 2451{2488.
di Giovanni, J., and A. A. Levchenko (2009): \Firm Entry, Trade, and Welfare in Zipf's
World," Working Paper.
Eaton, J., and S. Kortum (2002): \Technology, Geography, and Trade," Econometrica, 70(5),
1741.
Eaton, J., S. Kortum, and F. Kramarz (2011): \An Anatomy of International Trade: Evidence
from French Firms," Econometrica, forthcoming.
Ethier, W. (1982): \National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of Inter-
national Trade," American Economic Review, 72(3), 389{405.
Feenstra, R. (1994): \New Product Varieties and the Measurement of International Prices,"
American Economic Review, 84.
Feenstra, R., B. Mandel, M. Reinsdorf, and M. Slaughter (2009): \Eects of Terms
of Trade Gain and Tari Changes on the Measurement of U.S. Productivity Growth," NBER
Working Paper 15592.
Feenstra, R., M. Obstfeld, and K. Russ (2010): \In Search of the Armington Elasticity,"
Working Paper.
Ghironi, F., and M. Melitz (2005): \International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with
Heterogeneous Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Goldberg, P., A. Khandelwal, N. Pauvcnik, and P. Topalova (2009): \Imported Inter-
mediate Inputs and Domestic Productivity Growth: Evidence from India," Working Paper.
Hall, R. (1988): \The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry," Journal of
Political Economy, 96(5), 921{947.
(1990): \Invariance Properties of Solow's Productivity Residual," in Growth, Productivity,
Employment, ed. by P. Diamond. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge.
Halpern, L., M. Koren, and A. Szeidl (2009): \Imported Inputs and Productivity," Working
Paper.
Kehoe, T., and K. Ruhl (2008): \Are Shocks to the Terms of Trade Shocks to Productivity?,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 804{819.
Kohli, U. (2004): \Real GDP, real domestic income, and terms-of-trade changes," Journal of
International Economics, (62), 83{106.
Krugman, P. (1980): \Scale Economies, Product Dierentiation, and the Pattern of Trade,"
American Economic Review, 70(5), 950=959.
50Kydland, F., and C. Zarazaga (2002): \Argentina's Recovery and \Excess" Capital Shallowing
of the 1990s," Working Paper.
Melitz, M. (2003): \The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity," Econometrica.
Mendoza, E., and V. Yue (2009): \A Solution to the Default Risk-Business Cycle Disconnect,"
Working Paper.
Meza, F., and E. Quintin (2006): \Financial Crises and Total Factor Productivity," Working
Paper.
Neumeyer, P., and G. Sandleris (2010): \Understanding Productivity During the Argentine
Crisis," Working Paper.
Pierce, J., and P. Schott (2009): \A Concordance Between Ten-Digit U.S. Harmonized System
Codes and SIC/NAICS Product Classes and Industries," Working Paper.
Sandleris, G., and M. Wright (2011): \The Costs of Emerging Market Financial Crises:
Output, Productivity, and Welfare," Working Paper.
51Importer Name Primary Industry Primary Ave. Ann. Share of Share of
Sector Imports Imports, Imports,
($Millions) 2000 2002
1 Volkswagen Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 544.5 1.6 0.9
2 Ford Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 508.2 2.0 2.1
3 General Motors de Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 375.7 1.2 2.3
4 Renault Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 368.4 2.3 1.0
5 Peugeot Citroen Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 308.6 1.5 1.0
6 Daimler Chrysler Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 287.3 1.4 0.2
7 Siderar Steel Materials 288.8 0.8 1.9
8 Fiat Auto Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 242.1 0.6 0.5
9 YPF Int. Oil & Gas Energy 236.1 0.4 0.8
10 C.T.I. Wireless Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 210.1 0.2 0.1
11 Telefonica Comm. Per. Integrated Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 189.0 1.2 0.0
12 Monsanto Arg. Agr. Chems. Cons. Stpls. 176.5 0.9 2.0
13 Hewlett-Packard Arg. Tech. Distrib. IT 172.1 0.9 0.3
14 Toyota Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 169.6 0.6 0.7
15 Telecom Personal Wireless Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 165.6 0.8 0.0
16 Petrobras Energia Int. Oil & Gas Energy 156.4 0.1 0.5
17 Aluar Aluminio Arg. Aluminum Materials 138.4 0.6 1.0
18 Acindar Ind. Arg. de Aceros Steel Materials 129.9 0.3 0.9
19 Shell Co. Arg. De Petroleo Oil & Gas Explo. Energy 120.6 0.7 1.0
20 Industrias John Deere Arg. Const & Farm Mach. Industrials 112.1 0.2 0.2
21 Esso Petrolera Arg. Oil & Gas Explo. Energy 103.5 1.1 0.5
22 Siderca Building Products Industrials 102.3 0.3 0.6
23 Bayer Arg. Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 97.4 0.4 0.8
24 Honda Motor De Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 92.4 0.2 0.1
25 BGH Household Apps. Cons. Disc. 92.0 0.4 0.2
26 Siemens Arg. Elect. Equip. & Inst. IT 91.6 0.6 0.2
27 Scania Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 91.5 0.4 0.3
28 Productos Roche Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 89.5 0.5 0.8
29 Atanor Comm. Chems. Materials 88.9 0.2 0.4
30 Co. de Radiocom. Mobil. Wireless Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 87.2 1.1 0.1
31 IBM Arg. IT Consulting IT 83.7 0.5 0.4
32 Syngenta Agro Agr. Chems. Materials 82.7 0.1 0.4
33 Alta Plastica Distributors Cons. Disc. 76.8 0.4 0.3
34 Iveco Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 75.7 0.2 0.1
35 BASF Arg. Commodity Chems. Materials 73.9 0.3 0.5
36 Pirelli Neumaticos Tires & Rubber Cons. Disc. 73.7 0.2 0.6
37 Minera Alumbrera Limited Gold Materials 73.6 0.2 0.8
38 Unilever De Arg. Household Prods. Cons. Disc. 72.9 0.3 0.6
39 Tetra Pak Pkgd. Foods/Meats Cons. Stpls. 70.7 0.4 0.7
40 Novartis Arg. Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 67.5 0.4 0.4
41 Philips Arg. Tech. Distrib. IT 66.7 0.3 0.2
42 Procter & Gamble Arg. Household Prods. Cons. Disc. 67.6 0.2 0.3
43 Abbott Laboratories Arg. Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 65.8 0.4 0.7
44 Voridian Arg. Commod. Chems. Materials 65.0 0.2 0.8
45 Bridgestone Firestone Arg. Auto Parts & Equip. Cons. Disc. 62.0 0.2 0.4
46 Nidera Food Distributors Cons. Stpls.fs 63.2 0.2 0.3
47 AGCO Arg. Const. & Farm Mach. Industrials 61.8 0.1 0.1
48 Sipar Aceros Steel Materials 60.8 0.1 0.2
49 Aerolineas Arg. Airlines Industrials 60.3 0.7 0.2
50 Dow Quimica Arg. Comm. Chems. Materials 59.1 0.2 0.4
Table 7: Argentina's 50 Largest Importers
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